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ROTTEN TO THE CORE:
PROJECT CAPTURE AND THE
FAILURE OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN MONGOLIA
BRENT

T. WHITE*

Despite claims by international donor agencies that judicial reform efforts in
Mongolia have been a great success, this Article argues that Mongolian courts
continue to grossly lack integrity, transparency, and accountability-andare
perceived by the Mongolian public as more corrupt today than when donorfunded judicial reform efforts began almost a decade ago. This Article further
argues that the failure ofjudicial reform in Mongolia stems in significantpart
from the "capture" of donor-fundedjudicial reform efforts by elites within the
Mongolianjudicial sector. It concludes that the inherent tendency for project
capture in the "institution-building" approach to judicial reform that
internationaldonor agenciesfavor should add to calls to limit the approach in
favor of bottom-up efforts to pushfor meaningfuljudicialreform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By the early 2000s, systemic corruption was widely recognized as an
endemic and growing problem in post-communist Mongolia.1 "Grand"
corruption among political and economic elites was widespread and,
according to an assessment by the United States Agency for International
Development ("USAID"), threatened to "ultimately derail democracy
and development.",2 Courts were regarded as particularly corrupt, with
judges and prosecutors ranking in public opinion surveys just below
customs officials as the most corrupt governmental officials in
Mongolia.3
It was in this environment that multilateral and bilateral donor
institutions, including the World Bank and USAID, began to invest
millions of dollars to reform the Mongolian judiciary.4 These donor
agencies saw judicial reform as a key part of stemming corruption,
ensuring the "rule of law" and thereby promoting economic growth and

1 See generally CASALS & Assocs., ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN

9-10 tbl.1 (2005) (summarizing results of various
corruption studies across sectors of Mongolian government); MORRIS ROSSABI,
MONGOLIA: FINAL REPORT

MODERN MONGOLIA: FROM KHANS TO COMMISSARS TO CAPITALISTS 59-62

(2005) (discussing the relationship of corruption to foreign donor institutions);
David Sneath, Reciprocity and Notions of Corruption in Contemporary
Mongolia, 25 MONGOLIAN STUDIES 85, 85 (2002) (recognizing a "rapid increase
in perceived corruption").
2 CASALS & Assocs., supranote 1, at 1.
3Id. at 9.
4 Such institutions include, among others, the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank ("ADB"), Deutsche Gesellschaft ffir Technische
Zusammenarbeit ("GTZ"), and USAID. See, e.g., OPERATIONS EVALUATION
DEP'T, ASIAN DEV. BANK, MONGOLIA: FROM TRANSITION To TAKEOFF 28-30

(2008) (ADB); OPERATIONS POLICY & COUNTRY SERVS., THE WORLD BANK,
STATUS OF PROJECTS IN EXECUTION-FY08 635 (2008) (World Bank); U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., BUDGET JUSTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS: FISCAL

YEAR 2007 190 (2006); Division of Dev. Educ. & Info., Fed. Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Dev., Legal and Judicial Reform in Development
Cooperation 17 (Position Paper Special 064, 2002) (GTZ), available at
http://www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/spezial/spezia1064pdf.pdf
(last

visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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democracy. 5 Moreover, donor agencies, and USAID in particular,
recognized that "judicial [c]orruption ha[d] become a more prominent
issue," with "suspicions of improper influence and rumors ...

of high-

system." 6

level corruption in the judicial
Nevertheless, neither USAID
nor any other major donor agency chose to address corruption within the
judiciary directly.7

5 See INT'L PROGRAMS Div., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA

JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 2006 24 (2007) [hereinafter
REPORT 2006] ("Effective and efficient delivery of justice is vital for ensuring
that all Mongolians live within a state in which the rule of law is respected and
followed and essential for sustained economic growth."), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PDACI763.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, JudicialIndependence and Corruption ("measures of judicial
independence are related to other positive outcomes such as higher levels of
growth and of political and economic freedom"), in TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 15, 15

(Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007).
See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF

LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 93-122 (2006) (discussing role ofjudiciary
in rule of law); Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, Introduction: Rules
Systems and the Development Process, 2 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 1, 5-11
(2006) (summarizing findings that rule of law and governance policies are
holistically connected to economic and cultural norms and dynamically affect
local power dynamics).
6 INT'L PROGRAMS DIV., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
MONGOLIA
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM (JRP): 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2003)
[hereinafter REPORT 2002], available at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Report/
2002ReportEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
7 See, e.g., REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 16 ("Although the [Judicial
Reform Program ("JRP")] did not plan specific anticorruption activities for
2006, the JRP's work with the courts, POs and other relevant institutions focuses
largely on the development of efficient and transparent processes aimed at
reducing opportunities for corruption."). This is consistent with judicial reform
programs sponsored by international agencies in other countries. See, e.g., Linn
Hammergren, The Multilateral Development Banks and Judicial Corruption,
STRENGTHENING

JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE:

ELIMINATING

JUDICIAL

CORRUPTION, 9 CIJL YEARBOOK 2000 73, 74 (2001) ("for corruption as for

many other issues, a direct, frontal approach may not be the more effective
strategy").
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Rather, donor-funded judicial reform in Mongolia followed, and
continues to follow, an institution-building approach. 8 This approach,
which is consistent with donor-funded approaches to judicial reform in
other developing countries, aims to strengthen judicial institutions by, for
example, developing judicial resources and infrastructure, improving
"case management," enhancing judicial "professionalism" through
training and education, and increasing judicial salaries. 9 Moreover, this
approach is "top-down" in that reform priorities are set by, or at least
require the consent of, "key stakeholders"-which in Mongolia meant
the Supreme Court, the General Counsel of Courts, the General
Prosecutor's Office, and the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs
("MoJHA"). 10 Consistent with this approach, the offices of the major
8

See, e.g., REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 18 (noting that the JRP seeks to

build public support for judicial institutions).
9 See INT'L PROGRAMS Div., NAT'L CTR.FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA

JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 2007 3-5, 15-16 (2008)
[hereinafter REPORT 2007] (discussing JRP efforts in these areas), available at

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PDACL250.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). The
institution-building approach to judicial reform typically includes:
courthouse construction and repair; purchase of furniture, computers, and other
equipment and materials; drafting new laws and regulations; training judges,
lawyers, and other legal personnel; establishing management and
administration systems for judiciaries; support for judicial and other
training/management institutes; building up bar associations; and international
exchanges for judges, court administrators, and lawyers.
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment
Alternative 11-12 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series,
Working
Paper
No.
41,
2003),
available
at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
See also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., JUDICIAL

REFORM PROGRAM,

ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR JUSTICE SYSTEM OF

MONGOLIA 1-7 (2006) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006] (on file with

author) (discussing goals of JRP); Linn Hammergren, Fighting Judicial
Corruption: A Comparative Perspectivefrom Latin America (describing these
type of measures as "the usual reform measures"), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT 2007, supranote 5, at 138, 139.
10See INT'L PROGRAMS DIv., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA

JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM: 2001 ANNUAL REPORT ii (2002) [hereinafter
REPORT 2001] (noting that the JRP "responded to the priorities defined by the
Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs and is designed to assist in the
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donor-funded judicial reform programs in Mongolia, including USAID's
Judicial Reform Program ("JRP"), were physically located within the
MoJHA.1 1
While this collaborative approach may help ensure the participation
of institutional stakeholders, it also discourages discussion of
corruption-much less action to address it. Donor agencies are "wary of
fomenting bad relations with the courts" by bringing up the "corruption
issue" and judges, especially to the extent that they benefit from corrupt
practices, are "understandably reluctant to mention it.",12 Nevertheless,

donor agencies in Mongolia and elsewhere justify the institution-building
approach to judicial reform on that grounds that the "usual reform
measures"-such as training,13 increased professionalism14 and better
"management structures" 15 -will have the corollary effect of reducing
corruption and improper influence. 16 Reformers argue that corruption is
more prevalent when judges do not understand the law, cases are easily
"lost" due to lack of case management systems, judicial salaries are low

implementation of the Strategic Plan for the Justice System of Mongolia, a plan
developed by Mongolian stakeholders in 1999-2000, and passed by Parliament
in
2000"),
available
at
http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Report/
200 1ReportEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); REPORT 2007, supra note 9,
at 14, 20, 25 (identifying the Supreme Court, General Counsel of Courts,
General Prosecutor's Office, and MoJHA as key stakeholders). See also
REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 23 (specifically excluding the Mongolian bar
association from the list of "core stakeholders").
1 See generally Mongolia Judicial Reform Program, Main Page,
http://www.ncsc.mn (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (giving the address of the JRP
within the MoJHA building).
12 Hammergren, supra note 9, at 139.
13 REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 16-17.
14

Id. at 15.

15

Id. at5.

16 See

Hammergren, supra note 9, at 139 ( "Nonetheless, many of the usual
reform measures-new selection systems, higher salaries and budgets, real
judicial careers with guaranteed tenure, training, courtroom reorganisation and
automation, and law revision-were also seen as partial solutions. .

.

. For

example, the introduction of oral proceedings was said to increase transparency,
while better courtroom administration would reduce the chances for
manipulating files (a problem as often attributed to court staff as to judges).").
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and working conditions are poor. 17 Reformers thus contend that
addressing such second level facilitators of corruption will make
corruption both less attractive and more difficult to conceal. 18
Consistent with this theory, USAID claims that its nearly decadelong Mongolian JRP, which came to a close in March 2009,
"significantly improved transparency and efficiency, and reduced
opportunities for system manipulation," 19 and that, as a result, "[p]ublic
perception of the justice sector has improved in all areas since the JRP
began its work., 20 As such, USAID has concluded that the JRP was
"highly successful ' 21 and one of "the best projects ever implemented in
Mongolia.,

17

22

See INT'L PROGRAMS Div, NAT'L CTR FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA

(JRP) WORK-PLAN YEAR THREE 3 (2003)
[hereinafter WORKPLAN 2003] ("Inadequate salaries for judges, prosecutors, and
other judicial sector staff made these positions less attractive for well-qualified
JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM

lawyers and, most importantly, increased the potential for corruption."),
available at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Workplan/2003WPEnglish.pdf (last
visited Oct. 28, 2009) and id. at 8 (implying that strengthening and development
of case management systems creates a more accountable and accessible

judiciary).
18 See EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA ET AL., UNDERMINING THE FOUNDATIONS OF

(Hoover Inst. On War,
Revolution & Peace, Essays in Pub. Policy Series No. 114, 2005) (arguing that
"multiagency task force systems" incorporating electronic court records made
available to defense attorneys and the general public reduces corruption);
Vincent Yang & Linda Ehrics, The Professionalism of Judges: Education,
Salaries, and Career Structure in Asia ( "judicial reform efforts in Asia often
ORGANIZED CRIME AND PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION 20

include education and training as part of efforts to fight judicial corruption"), in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 48, 54.
19 USAID/Mongolia, Judicial Reform Program http://www.usaid.gov/mn/
programs/jrp/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
20 Judicial Reform Program: Q3 Updates 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/
programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html (posting of Skip Waskin, Sept. 15, 2005,
01:56) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
21
USAID/Mongolia Updates March 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/
updates/article-574.html (April 6, 2009) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
22 USAID/Mongolia Updates April 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/
updates/article-615.html (May 11, 2009) last visited Oct. 28, 2009). See also
REPORT 2007, supranote 9, at 3-4 (touting the successes of the JRP).
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USAID's claim of success is belied, however, by a public opinion
survey commissioned by the JRP itself in 2007. This survey found that
only 28.0% percent of Mongolians believe that they would be treated
fairly were they to find themselves in court. 23 It also found that around
85-90% of Mongolians believe that the courts show favoritism to the
wealthy, public officials, relatives and friends of court personnel, and
corporations. 24
Likewise, the survey reported that 72-75% of
Mongolians believe judicial decisions are influenced by political
considerations, judges' own personal interests, and by government
officials.25 Moreover, it reported that almost 97% of Mongolians believe
that the cost of going to court is increased by the necessity of "paying
26
bribes" and 94% believe that it is increased by "unethical behavior.,
More strikingly, the survey found that public attitudes toward the
judiciary have grown increasingly negative during the period of reform.27
For example, 21.3% of the public thought that corruption was a problem
within the judiciary in 2003, 33.8% thought it was a problem by 2005,
and 38.1% thought so by 2007. 28 Additionally, there has been a
"dramatic drop" in public confidence in the Supreme Court and the Tsets
(Constitutional Court) in particular.29 Tellingly, confidence in the courts
is significantly lower-and increasingly so-among individuals who
have had actual experience in the courts than among those who have
not-with a three-fold increase since 2005 in negative perception of the
courts among actual court users. 30
23 L. Sumati

& Ts. Sergelen, Trend Lines in Public Perception of Judicial

System Administration in Mongolia, in REPORT 2007, supra note 9, attach. G. at
20 tbl.7.1.8. The 2007 JRP annual report claims that this opinion survey found

that people "still believe" that judges are "honest and fair." REPORT 2007, supra
note 9, at 26. In fact, only 21% of respondents strongly agreed with that
statement in 2007. Sumati & Sergelen, supra,at 28 tbl.7.4.3.
24 Sumati & Sergelen, supra note 23, at 21 tbls.7.2.4-6, 32 tbl.7.5.2.
25 Id. at 29 tbl.7.4.10, 32 tbls.7.5.3-4.
26 Id.at 38 tbls.8.7-8.
27 See id.
at 2 (noting "significant changes in public attitudes of negative
nature" since 2005) and id. at 31 (noting "significant growth" in the percentage
of people who think that judicial decisions are influenced by "political
considerations"
and judges' "personal interests").
28
Id.at 39 tbl.8.1.
29
Id.at2.
30
Id.at2, 39 tbl.8.1.
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These surveys not only contrast with claims made by USAID about
the effectiveness of its Judicial Reform Program, but also contradict the
view of judges who contend that corruption is not a significant problem
within the judiciary. 31 Given that public perceptions of corruption may
overstate its actuality, 32 these insider views should not be dismissed. In
contrast, the fact that actual court users have the most negative
perceptions of the courts suggests that something more than public
misperception may be at play.
In an attempt to sort out competing claims about the status ofjudicial
reform in Mongolia, I conducted an assessment of the Mongolian courts
in the summer of 2008.33 This assessment found that while progress has
been made in improving judicial resources and training, Mongolian
courts still lack sufficient political independence and, contrary to the
claims of USAID, grossly lack integrity, transparency, accountability. In
addition, despite significant donor effort and expense in computerizing
case tracking systems and improving court administration the assessment
found that Mongolian courts are not particularly efficient.
For a discussion of judges' views of the courts, see infra note 50. As a
general matter, judges blame the perception of corruption within the judiciary on
an irresponsible press and incompetent lawyers who accuse judges of taking
bribes in order to cover their own inadequacies as lawyers. Interview with
Anonymous, Supreme Court Justice, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 6, 2008).
31

32 See Transparency Int'l, How PrevalentIs Bribery in the
JudicialSector?,

("the public often views its judiciary as more corrupt than it actually is: more
people around the world described their judiciary as 'extremely corrupt' than
have personally been part of judicial corruption"), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 11, 14. See also INT'L PROGRAMS DIv., NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM YEAR FOUR
WORKPLAN 8 (2004) ("public opinion surveys are an imperfect measure of
judicial effectiveness because the public has a relatively low level of expertise
about the judiciary and how judicial institutions should be working"), available
at http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Workplan/2004WPEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct.
28, 2009).
33 This assessment was conducted at the request of the Open Society Forum
of Mongolia ("OSF"). The opinions and conclusions drawn from the assessment
in this Article, however, are the author's alone, and should not be misconstrued
as the views of OSF. In Mongolia, the judiciary includes both the courts and the
prosecutor's office. The assessment looked only at the courts and the term
judiciary is used generally in this Article to refer to the courts only.
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The results of this assessment are important in their own right. But
their public disclosure is especially critical given USAID recent claims
that its JRP was one of its "best projects ever." 34 Such a rosy picture of
the success of judicial reform in Mongolia risks the project's approach
being repeated in other developing countries-particularly as Mongolia
has been held out by the donor community as "a model for democratic
development and anti-corruption in Central Asia." 35 This Article is thus
meant primarily as a counterpoint to the view of USAID, and its
implementing contractor, that judicial reform in Mongolia has been a
36
resounding success.
The Article also argues that the failure of judicial reform in
Mongolia stems in significant part from the "capture" of donor-funded
judicial reform by elites within the target judicial institutions-in much
the same way that domestic regulatory bodies can be captured by
regulated industries. It concludes that the inherent tendency for project
capture in the institution-building approach to judicial reform should add
to calls to limit top-down approaches to judicial reform in favor of a
bottom-up effort to build up local civil society organizations that can
push themselves for meaningful judicial reform.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE STATUS OF JUDICIAL REFORM

Assessing the status of judicial reform within a country is no simple
task. First, there is no generally accepted methodology, nor is there
agreement over which criteria are most important in evaluating a judicial

34

USAID/Mongolia Updates April 2009, supra note 22.
Bank Information Center, Mongolia: Overview, http://www.bicusa.org/
en/Region.22.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
36 See USAID/Mongolia, supra note 22, (referring to its previous judicial
reform projects as "some of the best projects ever implemented in Mongolia").
See also REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 3-4 (describing the successes of the JRP
in glowing terms). This USAID annual report on the JRP was prepared by its
implementing contractor, the U.S.-based National Center for State Courts
("NCSC"). NCSC also runs judicial reform programs for USAID in Haiti,
Kosovo, and Lebanon. In January 2001, NCSC received $10 million from
American taxpayers for its work in Mongolia alone. See REPORT 2001, supra
note 10, at 1.
3'
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Additionally, many aims of judicial reform-judicial
system. 37
independence, fairness, impartiality, and even efficiency to some
degree-tend toward qualitative rather than quantitative measurement. 38
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to identify some essential
characteristics of an independent, fair, impartial, and efficient judiciary.
For example, in an independent judiciary, decisions would be free from
undue political influence from other branches of government or other
Similarly, an impartial judiciary would not be
public officials.
influenced by payments, gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested
parties. To the extent that characteristics of an independent, impartial,
qualified and efficient judiciary can be identified, and assuming those are
the goals of the reform, the central task in assessing the progress of
reform in a particular judicial system lies in developing a metric for
measuring, more or less objectively, the extent to which these various
characteristics are descriptive of that judicial system.
For example, the Rule of Law Initiative of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") uses a Judicial Reform Index ("JRI") to
qualitatively assess the status of judicial reform in emerging democracies
and transitioning states.39 The JRI identifies 30 factors "that facilitate the

37 See Linn Hammergren, Diagnosing Judicial Performance: Toward a

Tool To Help Guide Judicial Reform Programs, paper prepared for

Transparency International 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference,
Durban 9-10 (Oct. 13, 1999) (discussing disagreement among reformers over the
correct methodology and criteria for evaluating judicial reform), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/hammergren
JudicialPerf.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
38 See id. at 3 ("[R]eformers have tended to shy away from the more
qualitative aspects ofjudicial performance.").
39 See generally American Bar Association, The ABA Rule of Law
Judicial Reform Index, http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/
Initiative:
judicial reform index.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (describing the basis
and application of the JRI). See also Mariana Sousa, A Brief Overview of
Judicial Reform

in

Latin America:

Objectives,

Challenges,

and

Accomplishments (noting that the American Bar Association's JRI developed for
the Eastern and Central European Law Initiative "serves as an analytic device to
evaluate the accomplishments of reform efforts"), in THE STATE OF STATE
REFORM IN LATN AMERICA 87, 106 (Eduardo Lora, World Bank, ed., 2007).
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40
development of an accountable, effective, independent judiciary."
Each factor is fashioned in the reform index as a descriptive statement
(e.g., "Ethnic and religious minorities, as well as both genders, are
represented amongst the pool of nominees and in the judiciary
generally., 41 ) and then allocated one of three values-positive, neutral,
or negative-depending on whether or not the statement corresponds to
the reality in a given country.4 2 If it strongly corresponds, the country is
given a score of "positive" for that statement. However, if the statement
is not at all representative of the conditions in that country, the country
gets a "negative" score. If the conditions within the country correspond
in some ways but not in others, it gets "neutral" score. Additionally
these 30 factors are grouped into categories including:
Quality,
Education, and Diversity; Judicial Powers; Financial Resources;
Structural Safeguards, Accountability and Transparency; and
Efficiency.43 This grouping of factors allows the reader to form a quick
impression of a country's progress in any given area."
While this approach has many strengths, which were incorporated
into an assessment tool for the Mongolian courts, it has several
weaknesses that the Mongolian assessment tool sought to avoid. First,
while the factors identified by the JRI are all relevant in assessing the
progress of judicial reform, the JRI does not include a number of other
factors that are relevant to status ofjudicial reform4 5 and fails specifically
to address a number of issues that should be of great importance to
judicial reform if the goal of reform is to promote fair and impartial
judicial decision-making. Many of these involve the degree of judicial

40

See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR GEORGIA

ii-iii

(2005) (explaining the methodology for assessing reform efforts), available at
http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/georgia-jri-2005-eng.pdf
(last visited
Oct. 28, 2009).
41 American Bar Association, The ABA Rule of Law Initiative:
Judicial
Reform Index Factors, http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/judicial-reform_
index factors.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
42 See Sousa, supra note 39, at 106.
43 American Bar Association, supranote 41.
44 The JRI, however, leaves it to the reader of the

JRI report to develop their
own impression of the judicial system's overall reform progress.
45 See, e.g., Hammergren, supra note 37, at 19-22 (proposing a detailed
checklist for evaluating judicial performance).
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integrity, transparency, and accountability. Thus, while borrowing
heavily from the JRI, the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts
identifies 60 separate factors (rather than 30 as in the JRI) that would be
indicative of successful judicial reform. 46 These factors were evaluated
as part of the assessment of the Mongolian courts.
An additional weakness of the JRI is that the score for each factor
represents the conclusion of one, or at most a few, "legal specialists who
are generally familiar with the country and region," after "limited
questioning of a cross-section of judges, lawyers, journalists, and outside
observers with detailed knowledge of the judicial system." 47 The JRI
thus risks being tainted by the biases of the specialist who is generally
familiar with the country and will consciously or unconsciously approach
the task with preconceived notions and opinions about the country's
judiciary. Such biases may cause the specialist to selectively attend to
information that supports those beliefs and discount or reinterpret
information that does not.48
To counter this possibility of bias, the assessment tool for the
Mongolian courts reflects the collective judgments of 22 individuals with
significant expertise and experience with the Mongolian judiciary, all of
whom completed anonymous and confidential surveys in which they

Some of the disparity in the number of factors comes from the fact that
the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts breaks some JRI factors into their
component parts. For example, rather than asking in one compound statement
whether "[e]thnic and religious minorities, as well as both genders, are
represented amongst the pool of nominees and in the judiciary generally," AM.
BAR ASS'N, supra note 40, at 16, the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts
asks separate questions-one about representation of minorities and the other
about gender representation. Similarly, whereas the JRI asks whether "[j]udicial
decisions are based solely on the facts and law without any undue influence
from senior judges (e.g. court presidents), private interests, or other branches of
government," AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 40, at 37, the assessment tool for the
Mongolian courts breaks this down into several questions and adds additional
questions related to other types of undue influence over court decisions.
47 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 40, at iii.
48 See Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton, Introduction (summarizing
collected papers addressing influence of emotion on perception), in
46

CONSCIOUSNESS

&

EMOTION:

PERCEPTION ix, x-xi (Ralph D.

AGENCY, CONSCIOUS CHOICE, AND SELECTIVE

Ellis & Natika Newton eds., 2005).
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evaluated the Mongolian courts on each of the 60 factors. 49 In choosing
the experts, every effort was made to draw from a broad cross-section of
the legal community and across the political spectrum.
Survey
participants included commercial attorneys, law professors, heads of
non-governmental organizations, public officials, law enforcement
officers, defense attorneys and prosecutors-such that no particular
viewpoint was overrepresented and one can have confidence at the very
least in areas where there was broad consensus among survey
participants.
Another concern with the JRI is that it scores each factor as only
negative, positive or neutral. Such a scoring system, while simple,
provides little information other than an up or down for each factor and
does not distinguish between factors that are overwhelmingly negative or
positive and those that are only marginally either. Additionally, as
discussed above, the positive or negative score represents the subjective
conclusion of only one or a few individuals-and thus appears to convey
more information than it actually does.
In contrast, the assessment tool for the Mongolian courts assigns
each factor a numerical score based upon the collective judgment of 22
Mongolian legal experts-and my personal opinion, as the "specialist"
conducting the assessment, is not reflected or included in the score. 50
49

50

See Appendix B, infra.

At the request of a member of the Supreme Court whom I interviewed, I

also distributed copies of the "Survey of the Status of Court Reform in
Mongolia" to the Research Center of the Supreme Court for distribution to
Supreme Court justices, primarily as a means of comparing the Courts'
perception of the judiciary with that of outside experts. There are 15 Supreme
Court Justices, but only eight surveys were returned by the Supreme Court's
Research Center. All but two of the returned surveys did not identify the
position of the individual who filled out the survey, as the form requests. Thus,
it was impossible to tell if the rest of the surveys were actually filled out by
Supreme Court Justices or were filled out by Supreme Court staff, such as clerks
or employees of the research center. Additionally, because the forms were
collected by one individual at the Supreme Court, the anonymity of the survey
participants and their ability to answer the survey without fear of reprisal may
have been compromised. As a general matter, however, the surveys returned by
the Supreme Court Research Center gave the judiciary significantly higher
scores than did the outside experts. This was particularly the case in terms of
court integrity-which the Supreme Court rated as high and outside experts
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Rather, the score represents the average response of experts surveyed on
a scale of 1-5 and asked to identify on that continuum the degree to
which they agreed that each positive statement was an adequate
reflection of the Mongolian Courts ("1" represented "Strongly Disagree"
and "5" represented "Strongly Agree"). Scores below 3 (with 3 being
"Neutral") are failing scores and those above 3 are passing scores and are
identified as such. Additionally, the assessment includes the percentage
of experts who agree or disagree with each statement so as to identify
those areas where there is widespread consensus as to the state of the
Mongolian courts.
Finally, the assessment tool, like the JRI, divides the factors into
categories (for example, "Integrity"), but unlike the JRI, each category is
given an overall "grade" reflecting the status of judicial reform in that
area.
The possible "grades" are excellent, sufficient, marginally
sufficient, marginally insufficient, insufficient, or grossly insufficient.
In order to inform these overall assessments with more than raw
numbers, the survey also invited written comments and explanations
from those who took the survey-an opportunity taken advantage of by
many survey participants. I also conducted in-person interviews with
various experts on the Mongolian Judiciary-including Supreme Court
Justices, attorneys, law professors, and heads of NGOs, public officials,
and law enforcement officers. While there was not a one-to-one
correlation to those interviewed and those surveyed, the narrative
accounts gathered during those interviews help elucidate the raw
numbers.
III. THE STATUS OF COURT REFORM IN MONGOLIA

As the below numbers show, quality, training and diversity of judges
is an overall area where judicial reform has made some significant
progress in Mongolia, but where much remains to be done. One
particular bright spot is continuing education of judges. This has been a
focus of GTZ, USAID, and the World Bank, all of which have not only

generally rated as extremely low. On the other hand, the Supreme Court surveys
reflected a need for more resources and better facilities, whereas outside experts
rated the level of court resources as sufficient.
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sponsored and funded numerous trainings, 1 but also helped establish the
National Law Center ("NLC"), housed in a gleaming new building, as a
hub for the training of judges and lawyers.5 2 The fact that a significant
plurality of experts (43%) agrees that judges receive adequate continuing
legal education, with only 19% disagreeing, is evidence of the success of
these efforts.
Table 1: Quality, Training, and Diversity-Insufficient
Survey Question

Avg.
Score

Distribution

Score

Judges are well-qualified (Judges have formal
university-level legal training and have practiced
before tribunals before taking the bench.)

2.4

Disagree 66%
Agree
20%
Neutral 14%

Failing

2.4

Agree
Agre

Fin
Fl

Judges are well-trained (Before taking the bench
judges are required to take relevant courses
concerning basic substantive and procedural areas of
conceningNeutral
the law and the role of the judge in society.)

1%
2

2400

Judges receive adequate continuing legal education
(Judges must undergo, on a regular basis
professionally prepared legal education courses,
which adequately inform them of changes and
developments in the law.)

3.3

Disagree 19%
Agree
43%
Neutral 33 %

Minority Representation (The number of judges who
are members of ethic and religious minorities
adequately reflects the percentage of ethnic and
religious minorities in the overall population.)

2.5

Disagree 42%
DsAgree 21%o
200
Agree
Faling
Neutral 3 7 %

Gender Balance (The number of male and female
judges is roughly equal at all levels of the court
system.)

2.0

Disagree 77%
Agree
5%
Neutral 18%

Passing

Failing

On the other hand, 66% percent of experts disagree with the
statement that judges are well-qualified to begin with and 57% believe
that they do not receive adequate training before taking the bench.
51

See REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 16-18 (describing the JRP's

involvement with continuing legal education in Mongolia).
52 See The World Bank Group, Projects and Operations: Contract Details:
Construction of the National Legal Center, http://web.worldbank.org/
external/projects/mainpagePK=104542&contractid=1233911 (last visited Oct.
28, 2009) (reporting that a US $999,000 contract was awarded for construction
of the NLC).
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Survey and interview participants suggested some possible reasons for
these low marks including concern that the clearest path to becoming a
judge is not legal competence but serving first as a court secretary.
Others complained that familial relations played a significant role in
selection of judges, with a few family networks occupying a large
number of judicial positions. Additionally, experts noted that the
selection process is highly politicized, with the President having
disproportionate influence over the selection ofjudges-such that loyalty
to the President may supersede all else in the selection of judges. That
said, a number of experts distinguished between Supreme Court Judges,
whom they felt tended to be highly qualified, and lower court judges,
who they felt often were not.
Table 2: Judicial Power/Authority-Sufficient
Survey Question
Courts have the authority to determine the ultimate
constitutionality of legislation and official acts.

Avg.
Score
4.0

Courts have exclusive, ultimate jurisdiction over all
cases concerning civil rights and liberties.

Distribution

Score

Provided by
Constitution

Passing

Provided by
Constitution

Passing

Court decisions are respected and enforced by other
branches of government.

2.7

Disagree 50%
Agree
32%
Neutral 18%

Failing

Court decisions may be reversed only through the
appellate process.

3.8

Disagree 9%
82
%
Agree
Neutral 9%

Passing

3.9

Disagree 9%
82%
Agree
Neutral 9%

Passing

3.8

Disagree 5%
Agree
77%
Neutral 18%

Passing

Other branches of government do not override or
ignore court decisions, or if they do, they are subject 3.0
to legal action.

Disagree 36%
Agree
41%
Neutral 22%

Neutral

Courts have adequate
enforcement powers.

subpoena, contempt, and

The courts' subpoena, contempt, and enforcement
powers are utilized and supported by other branches
of government.

Mongolian courts are not lacking in formal authority or power; as the
survey results show, they received higher marks here than in any other
category. Much of the authority of the Mongolian Courts is vested in the
Courts by the Constitution itself. For example, Article 47(1) provides
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that judicial power belongs solely to the courts.53 Article 50(2) provides
that Supreme Court decisions are final judiciary decisions that are
binding upon all courts and other parties. 4 Article 50(1)(3) empowers
the Supreme Court "to examine and take decision on matters55 related to
the protection of law and human rights and freedoms therein.,
In addition, Mongolia has a separate and independent Constitutional
Court, or Constitutional Tsets, 6 that has "supreme" authority to interpret
the Constitution 5 ' and the power to invalidate "laws, decrees and other
decisions of the State Great Hural and the President, as well as
Government decisions and international treaties signed by Mongolia"
that are incongruous with the Constitution.58
Nevertheless, 50% of experts surveyed disagreed with the statement
"Court decisions are respected and enforced by other branches of
government., 59
Similarly several experts who were interviewed
indicated that the executive branch often does not honor court decisions
with which it disagrees. This raises the concern that the Supreme Court
does not, in fact, have the final authority to interpret the law, and that
government officials are free to ignore Supreme Court decisions with
which they disagree.60
Indeed, the Constitution itself seems to
undermine the "final authority" ostensibly given to the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, Article 50(2) provides that if the Supreme Court makes an
interpretation that is "incompatible with a law, the latter shall have
precedence. 61 What is left unclear in practice, however, is who has the
53MONGOL ULSYN UNDSEN KHUULI [Constitution] art. 47

§ 1 (1992)

(Mong.), translatedat http://www.frc.mn/eng/index.php?option=com docman&
task=doc download&gid=330&Itemid=29 [hereinafter MONG. CONST.] (last
visited
Oct. 28, 2009).
54
Id.art. 50 § 2.
55
1Id. art. 50 § 1.
56 See id arts. 64-67 (describing the composition and finction
of the
Constitutional
Court).
57

Id.art. 64 § 1.
66 § 2.
59 See supra, Table 2.
60 One expert indicated that even tax inspectors feel free to ignore the
58

1Id. art.

Supreme Court's decisions when they believe the Supreme Court's
interpretations to be wrong. Interview with Tsogt Natsagdorj, Partner, Bona Lex
Law Firm, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 7, 2008).
61MONG. CONST., supranote 53, art. 50 § 2.
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Supreme Court's

interpretation

is

Table 3: Survey Results on Judicial Resources and InfrastructureMarginally Insufficient
Avg.

Survey Question

Score

Distribution

Score

The overall budget of the courts is adequate to satisfy
the demand for court services.

2.8

Disagree 33%o
29%
Agree
Neutral 38%

Faling

The overall budget of the courts has increased
proportionately with the growth of the national
budget.

3

Disagree 19%
Agree
23%
Neutral 58%

Neutral

The judiciary receives a share of the national budget
reflective of its position as co-equal branch of
government

3.2

Disagree 19%
Agree
47%
Neutral 33%

Passing

Offices provided to judges and court administrators
are adequate to allow performance of their duties

3.2

Disagree 41%
Agree
50%o
90o
Ne
Neutral 9%

Passing

The court system operates with a sufficient number
of computers and other equipment to enable it to
handle its caseload in a reasonably efficient manner.

3.9

Disagree 5%
Agree
78%
Neutral 18%

Passing

Each judge has the staff support necessary to do his
or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to handle
documentation and legal research.

3.7

A system exists so that new court positions are
created as needed.

2.8

Judges' salaries are adequate. Judges salaries are
based on a reasonable proportion of private sector
wages and are generally sufficient to attract and
retain qualified judges, enabling them to support their
families and live in a reasonably secure environment
without having to supplement with additional sources
of income.

3.0

Disagree 36%
Agree
46%
Neutral 18%

Neutral

Court buildings provide a respectable environment
for the dispensation of justice with adequate
infrastructure.

2.1

Disagree 63 %
Agree
5%
Neutral 32 %

Failing

62

Disagree 10%
Agree
80%
Neutral 10%
Disagree28
Dsagree 28%
19%
Agree
Neutral 520%

Passing

Failing

The Constitution seems suggest that authority belongs to the Supreme

Court alone. See id. (granting the Supreme Court "final" and "binding" judicial
authority).

2009]

JUDICIAL REFORMINMONGOLIA

Improving judicial resources and infrastructure is another area where
the Mongolian judiciary has made considerable strides, mainly due to the
largess of the international donor community. For example, USAID
modernized and equipped the Capital City and eight district courts with
computers, furniture and audio equipment,6 3 and the World Bank funded
the repairing and furnishing of the Supreme Court's courtrooms, the
Capital City Administrative courts, and Darkhan-Uul Aimag.64 As a
result of these improvements, more than 78% of the experts surveyed
agreed that the Mongolian court system "operates with a sufficient
number of computers and other equipment to enable it to handle its
65
caseload in a reasonably efficient manner.,
Mongolia has also made significant strides in improving judicial
support staffing-each judge now has a set of court clerks. With this
addition, 80% of the experts agreed that judges have "the staff support
necessary to do his or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to handle
documentation and legal research. 66
Judicial salaries have also
increased five times by a total of 220%,67 which translates to current
salaries of roughly US $300-400 per month for lower court judges, and
around US $700 per month for Supreme Court Judges.68 This amount is
generally sufficient for judges to support their families and live in a
reasonably secure environment. 69
Even so, judicial salaries are
unfavorable compared to private sector wages for professionals, and
indeed, are significantly less than the salaries received by even relatively
junior professional employees of some civil society organizations.70
REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 28-34.
For a list of the contract awards and amounts awarded by the World Bank
Group for the renovation, construction, and furnishing of the Mongolian courts,
search for "Mongolia" at The World Bank Group's Projects Portfolio,
http://www.worldbank.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
61 See supra, Table 3.
66 See id.
67
ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 40.
68
Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, Supreme Court Justice,
63

See ASSESSMENT

64

Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 21, 2008).
69 Cf ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 40 (indicating that despite
the salary increases, "the judges' salaries ... are not yet sufficient to guarantee

decent living conditions.").
70 Interview with Tsogt Natsagdorj, supra note 60.
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When compared to the salaries of top local corporate attorneys in
Ulaanbaatar-who have billing rates of US $150 or more-judicial
salaries are woefully insufficient to attract the best and the brightest
attorneys.71
Furthermore, judicial positions in Mongolia are not
prestigious enough to compensate for the low salary.7 2 Moreover,
despite recent improvements to the Mongolian courtrooms, a significant
majority of experts surveyed (63%) reported that court buildings, as a
whole, still do not provide a respectable environment and infrastructure
for the dispensation of justice.73
Finally, the judiciary budget remains low, both in absolute dollar
amounts and in comparison to the other branches of government. In fact,
the judiciary budget constitutes less than 0.5% of the national budget.74
As a result, only 29% of the experts agreed that the overall court budget
was sufficient to meet judicial demands.75 Nevertheless, the Mongolian
Legislature has repeatedly rejected proposals to make the judicial budget
to a percentage of the national budget, even when the requested budget is
a mere 1% of the national budget.76 Consequently, the judicial budget is
not only minimal at best, and actually less that the amount the courts
generate in user fees each year, but also subject to manipulation by the
other branches of the government.77
Thus, despite significant
improvement in judicial resources and infrastructure, the situation is
marginally sufficient at best.

71

72

id.
There are, however, many opportunities to supplement one's judicial

salary through corrupt activities. See infra, Table 4 & accompanying text.
73 See Table 3, supra.
74 Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, supra note 68.
7' As shown in Table 3, supra, only 29% of the experts surveyed agreed
with the statement: "The overall budget of the courts is adequate to satisfy the
demand for court services."
76 Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, supra note 68.
77 id.
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Table 4: Survey Results on Judicial Independence-Insufficient
Survey Question

Avg.
Score

Distribution

Score

The court system has sufficient input and control
over its own budget. The courts have a meaningful
opportunity to influence the amount of money
allocated to the courts by the legislative and/or
executive branches. Once the funds are allocated to
the courts, the courts have control over their own
budget and expenditure.

3.1

Disagree 32%
Agree
41%
Neutral 27%

Passing

The selection and appointment process fosters the
selection of independent, impartial judges. Judges
are appointed based on objective criteria, such as
passage of an exam, performance in law school, other
training, experience, professionalism, and reputation
in the legal community. While political elements
may be involved, the overall system fosters the
selection of independent, impartial judges.

2.7

Disagree 32%o
54%
Agree
Neutral 14%

Failing

Judges are provided adequate security. Sufficient
resources are allocated to protect judges from threats
such as harassment, assault, and assassination.

2.5

Disagree 55%
Agree
14%
Neutral 32%

Falling

3.9

Disagree 9%
Agree
770
Neutral 140

Passing

Judges are promoted through the court system on the
basis of objective criteria such as ability, integrity,
and experience.

3.1

Disagree 23%
Agree
36%
Neutral 41%

Passing

Judges may be removed from office or otherwise
punished only for specified official misconduct and
through a transparent process, governed by objective
criteria.

3.0

Disagree
32%
Agree
41%o
Neutral 27%

Neutral

Once assigned to a case, a judge may be removed
only for good cause, such as a conflict of interest or
an unduly heavy workload.

3.1

Disagree 32%
Agree
50%
Neutral 23%

Passing

A judges' association exists, the sole aim of which is
to protect and promote the interests of the courts, and
this organization is active.

2.3

Disagree 40%
Agree
5%
Neutral 40%

Falling

Court decisions are free from political influence from
other branches of government or other public
officials.

2.5

Disagree 43%
Agree
19%
Neutral 38%

Failing

Judges have guaranteed tenure. Judges are appointed
for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed tenure,
which is protected until retirement age or the
expiration of a defined term of substantial duration.
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Although Mongolian judges do not lack in formal authority, are
constitutionally independent from the other branches of government, and
are guaranteed life tenure, the reality of judicial independence leaves
much to be desired. Indeed, only 19% of the experts surveyed agree that
"Court decisions are free from political influence from other branches of
government or other public officials."7 8 Many of the experts share the
view that high-ranking government officials, and in particular the
President, exert considerable influence over Supreme Court and Tests
decisions. Moreover, some experts identified specific instances where
high-ranking government officials arranged specific outcomes by
interfering directly with judges. This, however, is not to imply that
government officials interfere in most cases. Indeed, most cases are
likely free from political interference. But for cases where the personal,
political, or business interests of government officials are at stake, the
outcome is often heavily influenced.
Unfortunately, judicial reform in Mongolia has done little to address
political interfering in judicial decision-making. In fact, certain features
of the current system seem to reinforce, rather than restrict, such
corroding influences. First, the President has disproportionate power
over the appointment, removal, and promotion of judges, and
furthermore, each process lacks sufficient transparency. Second, the
judiciary budget, as well as the judges' salaries, are subject to decrease in
any given year.79 In the words of one Supreme Court justice, "the
judicial budget depends on maintaining good relations with those in the
legislative and executive branch who control budgetary decisions. 80
This justice also indicated that the current Chief Justice has been very
good at maintaining good relations, but "who knows what he had to give
in return. 81 Third, the Judicial Code of Conduct does not prohibit
judges from privately discussing pending or future litigation with other
public officials or other non-parties who are free to convey their
82
preferred outcomes to the judges.

78

See Table 4, supra.

79

Interview with Anonymous, supranote 3 1.

80 id.
81

1d

82

See Judicial Disciplinary Committee, Roundtable Meeting of Ethics and

Disciplinary Committees and Councils of Legal Institutions I (Apr. 19, 2006)
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Table 5: Survey Results on Judicial Integrity-GrosslyInsufficient
Survey Question

Avg.
Score

Distribution

Court decisions are not influenced by payments,
gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested
parties.

2.0

Disagree 77%
Agree
0%
Neutral 2 3 %

Failing

Family, social, business, or other relationships do not
influence judges' conduct or judgment.

2.0

Disagree 73%
Agree
9%
Neutral 18%

Failing

Court decisions are free from the appearance of
impropriety. Judges refrain from hearing cases in
which the judge's family, social, business, or other
relationships may create the appearance of a conflict
of interest, whether or not such a conflict actually
exist.

2.3

Disagree
Agree 59%
90o
Neutral 32%

Faling

Judges refrain from ex parte communications.
Judges refrain from substantive communication with
parties and their attorneys regarding matters before 2.0
the court outside the presence of the other parties or
their attorneys.

Disagree 82%
9
Agree
%
Neutral 0%

Failing

Trial court decisions are reached without any undue
influence from senior judges within the courts. The 2.3
senior judges include chief judges, Supreme Court
judges, etc.

Disagree
64%
Agree
14%o
Neutral 220

Failing

Score

From the expert surveys and interviews, there was near universal

agreement that court decisions are influenced by improper payments to
judges and the judges' personal interests.

A full 77% of the experts

surveyed disagreed with the statement that "Court decisions are not
influenced by payments, gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested

parties.

83

In addition, 73% disagreed with the statement that "Family,

social, business, or other relationships do not influence judges' conduct
or judgment." 84 While one might expect, and should therefore guard
against, a certain degree of relational influence over judicial decisionmaking in a country as small as Mongolia, the fact that none of the
(on file with author) ("Personal communication that might create an appearance
of impropriety is discouraged, but not outright banned.").
83 See Table 5, supra. Notably, none of the experts surveyed agreed with
the statement.
84
id.
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experts felt that judicial decisions were not influenced "by payments,
gifts, or favors from litigants or other interested parties," suggests a
degree of outright bribery and corruption that cannot be rationalized."
Indeed, the experts interviewed expressed grave concern over corruption,
and described judicial corruption as "pervasive." Furthermore, these
experts pointed to numerous examples of judges trading decisions for
personal or family gain, including apartments, health care abroad for
family members, and, most commonly, cash.
Table 6: Survey Results on Judicial Code of Ethics-Insufficient
Survey Question

Avg.
Score

Distribution

Score

The code of ethics for judges adequately defines and
prohibits judges from hearing cases in which they
have a conflict of interest.

2.5

Disagree 55%
Agree
23%
Neutral 23%

Failing

The code of ethics for judges prohibits ex parte
communications.
The code of ethics for judges prohibits judges from
engaging in political activity.

2.3

3

Disagree

530%

Agree
Neutral

33%

140%

Disagree 32%
Agree
32%
Neutral 36%

Failing

Neutral

Mongolia suffers from a weak judicial code of ethics that does not
adequately define or prohibit judicial impropriety, nor guard against the
appearance of impropriety, leading to the perception of corruption as
well as actual judicial corruption. 86 For example, the judicial code of
ethics does not prohibit ex parte communications between judges and
parties 87 and 82% of the experts surveyed agreed that judges do, in fact,

85See id.

86

See, e.g., WORKPLAN 2003, supra note 17, at 24-25 (indicating that

amongst judges there was much confusion and misunderstanding as to the new
ethical rules, forcing the JRP to create study guides and videos to educate the
judiciary). Cf REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 25 (finding that despite the
Judicial Reform Program's recommendations for a new code of ethics, "some
judges did not understand the need for a code of judicial ethics that held them to
a higher standard than civil servants").
87 REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 25. See also Judicial Disciplinary
Committee, supranote 82.
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privately meet with parties and/or their lawyers.88 Regardless of the
substance of the discussions, such ex parte communications create an
opportunity for corruption and may contribute to the public's general
suspicion of the courts. Additionally, the judicial code of ethics does not
prohibit judges from hearing cases in which they have a conflict of
interest. The surveyed experts indicated that judges frequently hear
cases in which the judge's family, social, business, or other relationships
create a conflict of interest. But regardless of whether judicial decisions
are actually influenced by such conflicts, the lack of a clear prohibition
creates an appearance of impropriety that no doubt contributes to the
public perception of corruption within the courts. Moreover, anecdotal
evidence suggests that these conflicts may indeed frequently influence
judicial outcomes.
Table 7: Survey Results on Judicial Accountability-Insufficient
Survey Question
A meaningful process exists under which other
judges, lawyers, and the public may register
complaints concerning misconduct by individual
judges.
Complaints of misconduct by judges are adequately
investigated.

Avg.
Score
2.8

Distribution
Disagree 41%
Agree
27%
Neutral 3 2 %
Disagree

46

Score

Failing

%
Failing

2.5

Agree
Neutral

2.7

Disagree 32%
Agree
19%
Neutral 50%

Failing

Investigations of misconduct by judges are not
influenced by unofficial payments, gifts, or favors 2.7
from judges or other interested parties.

Disagree 41%
Agree
18%
Neutral 41%

Failing

Complaints of misconduct by judges are investigated
without political interference from other branches of
government.

230%

31

In addition to a weak judicial code of ethics, Mongolian judges who
engage in clearly prohibited activities, such as taking bribes, are rarely
held accountable.
Though Mongolia has established a Judicial
Disciplinary Committee, the experts surveyed expressed concern that the
Disciplinary Committee is used primarily to punish judges who are too
independent, rather than those who abuse their power to solicit or accept
bribes, or otherwise further their own self-interest. For example, one
18

See Table 6, supra.
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judge was reportedly brought before the Disciplinary Committee for
"performance issues" after he publicly disagreed with the Chief Judge
over whether the judiciary should "work as a team,"
arguing instead that
89
judgment.
independent
exercise
judges should
The experts also expressed concern-both in face-to-face interviews
and in the survey-that judicial misconduct investigations are tainted by
political interference and bribery.
Because Judicial Disciplinary
proceedings lack transparency, however, it is difficult to substantiate
such concerns. Nevertheless, the Judicial Disciplinary Committee has
released general statistics, which illustrate that the vast majority of
complaints against judges are dismissed without action or explanation. 90
For example, between 2003 and 2005, 22 of the 28 complaints against
judges in Ulaanbaatar were dismissed without explanation. 91
Furthermore, no information is publicly available as to who filed the
complaints, the general content of any of the allegations, or the ultimate
disposition of the other six complaints that were not dismissed.92 In the
absence of public transparency, or an independent audit, the Judicial
Disciplinary Committee is a black box, the inner workings of which
remain a mystery. Given the prevalence of grand corruption in
Mongolia, the public-including the bar association-is also suspicious
of corruption within the Disciplinary Committee.
Because Mongolian law does not provide for whistleblower
protection to individuals who report corruption, individuals risk
persecution should they report instances of corruption to the authorities.
Additionally, given the growing misuse of defamation law to silence
those who report corruption, including the high-profile jailing of several
reporters who have reported specific corruption incidents, there are few
individuals willing to come forward even when they themselves are not

89 Interview with Anonymous, Professor of Law, National University of
Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 22, 2008).
90 ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 53.
91 Id. Nationally, only 14 judges were disciplined for unspecified reasons,

though 143 complaints were filed. See REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 10.
92 Cf REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 10 (noting the JRP-recommended
implementation of systems to inform complainants of the status of their
complaints, but not mentioning any public disclosure).
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implicated.93
The silencing of those who would report judicial
corruption reflects a broader climate of systemic corruption and lack of
accountability in Mongolia.
The glaring lack of transparency as to how courts actually make
decisions is one possible explanation for the high level of perceived or
real corruption within the Mongolian courts. The lack of transparency
not only enables corrupt judges to hide impropriety, but also results in
individuals suspecting corruption, even when there is none. Given the
systemic nature of corruption in Mongolia, one can hardly fault a losing
litigant for, in the absence of a detailed written decision, suspecting that
the judge may have been bought. Experts believe that the only way to
fight this perception of corruption is through a resolute commitment to
absolute transparency. Regrettably, agencies dealing with judicial
reform in Mongolia have failed to make transparency a sufficient
priority, despite frequent claims that increasing "transparency" is a core
goal of reform.94 As evidence of this failure:
" Only 18% of the experts surveyed agree that judges are assigned
to cases in a transparent and objective manner.95
* Although courtroom proceedings are technically open to the
public, in practice, courtrooms have inadequate space to
accommodate the public. As a result, members
of the public are
96
trials.
and
hearings
from
routinely excluded

9' One public official within the anti-corruption agency, in fact, warned me
that I would risk prosecution for defamation if I published this report, and
particularly if I identified specific judges as those perceived to be most corrupt
by attorneys. Interview with Anonymous, Prevention and Public Awareness
Department, Anti-Corruption Agency, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (June 5, 2008).
94 The 2006 Judicial Reform Program ("JRP") annual report claims, for

example, that 2006 was "highlighted by improved access to and transparency in
the courts," and identifies courtroom redesign and renovation as one of the main
activities leading to increased transparency. REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 3.
The 2006 report also argues that that the JRP increased "transparency" through
the creation of a website, www.judgeinfo.mn, which operates as a source of
basic information about the courts "including court decisions." Id. at 3. Local
attorneys complain, however, that the website contains very few decisions and is
frequently inaccessible. Interview with Tsogt Natsagdorj, supra note 60.
95 See Table 8, infra.

Court Observer Program by Otgontenger Univ., Final Report (2005) (on
file with author). I also witnessed court clerks order all members of the public,
96
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Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions are rarely
published, and when published, are not widely circulated.
District court decisions are never published, and are not
otherwise available to the public.
There are no transcripts of trial court proceedings. The only
records of trial court proceedings are court-produced summaries
of the trial testimony that provide, at best, an incomplete record,
and, at worst, a distorted record for appeal.
Even these incomplete court-produced summaries of trial court
proceedings are not available to the media or the general public.
82% of the experts surveyed indicate that court users do not have
easy access to information on the status of their cases. 97
District courts typically announce outcomes but rarely explain
the reasoning (i.e., the facts and the application of the law)
behind their decisions, leading to a sense of inscrutability as to
the basis of court decisions.
Supreme Court and significant appellate opinions are rarely
subject to academic scrutiny, 9s which contributes not only to
sloppy and unclear decisions, but also to a lack of accountability,
as questionable decisions are not subject to criticism.

except for the parties, out of courtrooms on several occasions. For example, I
was twice ordered to leave myself.
97 Despite USAID touting the new public access computers stationed in
many courthouses as evidence of the progress of judicial reform in Mongolia,
see ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 9, at 15-19, there is still a lack of
access to information. In reality, the public access computers are often turned
off, broken, or otherwise inaccessible to the public. Court Observer Program,
supra note 96.
98 One expert explained that most law professors must also
practice law in
order to survive given their low salaries and fear that criticizing the courts would
threaten their livelihood. Most academics, the expert explained, "are in the
pockets of the judges." Interview with Anonymous, supra note 89.
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Table 8: Survey Results on Judicial Transparency-Grossly Insufficient
Avg.
Score

Survey Question

Distribution

Score

Disagree 680%
Neutral 130%

Supreme Court and significant appellate
opinions are subjected to academic scrutiny.
Supreme Court and significant appellate
opinions are subjected to scrutiny by the media
and the general public.

2.7

Disagree 50%
Agree
41%
Neutral 9%

Failing

Judges are assigned to cases by an objective
method, such as by lottery, or according to their
specific areas of expertise.

2.6

Disagree 41%
Agree
18%
Neutral 41%

Failing

Courtroom proceedings are open to the public
and the media.

2.5

Disagree 59%
23%
Agree
Neutral 18%

Failing

Disagree 82%
Agree
900
900
Ne
Neutral 9%

Failing

2.5

Disagree 68%
Agree
23%
Neutral 5%

Failing

2.2

Disagree 860%
140%
Agree
Neutral 0%~

Failing

Transcripts or some other reliable record of
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are
available to litigants and their attorneys.

3.5

Disagree 14%
Agree
69%
Neutral 17%

Passing

Transcripts or some other reliable record of
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are
available to the media and general public.

2.2

Disagree 63%
Agree
14%
Neutral 23%

Failing

Disagree 820
9%
Agree
Neutral 9%

Failing

space
adequate
have
Courtrooms
accommodate the public and the media.

to

Court decisions are generally a matter of
accessible public record.
Supreme Court and
opinions are published.

significant

20

appellate

Court users have easy access to information on
the status of their case.
Current law is distributed and indexed. There is
a nationally recognized system for indexing
current domestic laws and jurisprudence, and
identifying and organizing changes in the law.

2.7

Agree
Neutral

41%
140

Failing
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Table 9: Survey Results on Judicial Efficiency and Predictability-

Insufficient
Survey Question
The court system maintains an effective and
accessible case filing and tracking system that
ensures cases are heard in a reasonably
efficient manner.

Avg.
Score
2.7

Distribution

Agree
Neutral

27%
23%

Score

Failing

Judges follow and enforce procedural rules.

2.2

Disagree 6 8 %
Agree
14%
Neutral 18%

Rules of evidence exist as to what evidence
judges may or may not consider.

2.4

Disagree 63%
Agree
23%o
140o
Ne
Neutral 14%

Failing

Judges follow any existing rules of evidence.
Judges do not consider improper evidence nor
exclude proper evidence.

2.3

Disagree 63%
Agree
23%
Neutral 14%

Failing

Court standards for evaluating legal arguments
exist and are applied in a predictable fashion.

2.1

Failing

Disagree 64%
Neutral 14%

Despite the fact that the Judicial Reform Program focuses on

improving judicial efficiency through better case management and court
automation, 99 only 27% of the experts surveyed agree that there is an
effective and accessible case management system. 100 Similarly, 68% felt
that judges fail to follow and enforce procedural rules for handling
101

cases.
Moreover, the survey participants indicated that judges do not
enforce procedural rules, do not follow rules of evidence, and do not
apply legal standards or rules in a predictable fashion. 10 2 The
unpredictability and unevenness of judicial decision-making is reflected
in the error rate in district court decisions, which approaches nearly

99 See REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 10-13 (describing JRP programs and
results).
100 See Table 9, supra. Notably, 50% of the experts surveyed disagreed
with the statement that the court system maintains an effective and accessible
case filing and tracking system.
101 Id.
102

Id.
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80%.103 This error rate is persuasive evidence that district court judges
are either unqualified, continue to be inadequately trained, or decide
cases (or are reversed) on the basis of external factors such as political
influence or bribery.
Table 10: Survey Results on Judicial Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms-Insufficient

Survey Question
The

pre-trial

settlement

Avg.
Score

of disputes

is

encouraged but not forced.
Established alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration
provide a viable alternative to court processes.

Distribution

Score

Disagree 28%

3.2

Agree 58%
Neutral 14%

Passing

2.5

Disagree 54%
Agree 23%
Neutral 13%

Failing

Mongolia has taken a number of positive steps to promote alternative
dispute resolution. First, to encourage pre-trial settlement, the filing fees
are halved for parties who settle before trial. 10 4 Mongolian law also
allows for voluntary binding arbitration of any civil dispute, either before
established tribunals such as one set up by the Chamber of Commerce, or
an ad hoc tribunal agreed upon by the parties. 10 5 Additionally, on May 5,
2006, a mediation center, staffed by nine attorneys, was established with6
10
the assistance of the Japan International Cooperation Agency.
Nevertheless, several of the experts interviewed gave the mediation
center low marks in terms of quality. Moreover, mediation is not
formally recognized as a form of dispute resolution in Mongolian law,
and there are no court-annexed mediation programs. Judges also lack the

103

Interview with Luvsandorj Byambaa, supra note 68. Only 3% of civil

cases are actually appealed.

Id. Possible explanations for this low rate of

appeal, despite a reversal rate that would seem to encourage appeals, are: lack
of financial resources to appeal, lack of information about the right to appeal,
or-as one expert suggested-that only those who are well-connected enough to
be able influence the appellate courts bother to appeal. Interview with
Anonymous, Corporate Attorney, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 6, 2008).
104 ASSESSMENT REPORT 2006, supranote 9, at
75.
105
Id. at 76.
106

1d. at 7.
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power to order parties to attempt settle their dispute through mediation
before continuing with litigation.
IV. THE DANGERS OF CAPTURE BY TARGET ("REGULATED") JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS
The actual state of the Mongolian judiciary hardly supports USAID's
claim that its Judicial Reform Program was "very successful" and "one
of its best projects ever." 10 7 In particular, the Judicial Reform Program
failed to deliver on its primary goal to "[i]ncrease transparency and
accountability throughout the judicial sector." 10 8 Nor did the project
substantially
improve
judicial
efficiency,
predictability,
or
1°9
transparency-despite USAID claims to the contrary.
In short, the
substance and quality of the "justice" dispensed by the Mongolian courts
does not seem to have changed for the better. It is just dispensed in
better surroundings, by better paid judges, who have nice computers.
The failure of judicial reform to noticeably improve judicial
integrity, accountability or transparency stems at least in significant part
from the failure to implement meaningful and comprehensive measures
to address corruption. 110 This less-than-vigorous approach to addressing
USAID/Mongolia, supranote 22.
REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 1. See also REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at

107 See
108

20 ("One of the main goals of the JRP throughout the project has been to
increase the transparency and accountability of the courts. One important
activity that was implemented to achieve this goal was the installation of Public
Access Terminals (PATs) in each court.)" As discussed above, supra note 74,
the PATs which are touted as proof of the success of the JRP in increasing
transparency are frequently turned off or otherwise inaccessible to court users.
See Court Observer Program, supra note 96.
109 See REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 3 ("A number of JRP activities have
led to better access to and increased transparency in the judicial sector.").
110 The establishment of a Special Investigative Unit to investigate
misconduct by justice sector officials "was the only concrete step by the
Government of Mongolia to combat crime and corruption within the justice
sector." REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 8. A consultant hired by JRP found,
however, that the SIU's ability to investigate corruption is severely limited by
underfunding and the failure of the legislature to give the StU "authority to
conduct surveillance and undercover operations." Emery E. Adoradio, Special
Investigative Unit Under the Prosecutor General PreliminaryAssessment and
Recommendations, in REPORT 2006, supra note 5, attach. B at 2. As such,
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corruption may have reflected, in part, inadequate political will among
key Mongolian stakeholders within the judiciary and government. 111 It is
not enough, however, to blame the failure of judicial reform on corrupt
Mongolian elites. Lack of political will to address judicial corruption
should have factored into the decision of whether and under what
conditions to embark on judicial reform in Mongolia in the first place,
and might have warranted an early end to some donor projects. As early
as 2002, for example, USAID recognized that "lack of accountability and
transparency, and lack of public trust and confidence" threatened the
ability of the Mongolian judiciary to12 serve the interests of a "democratic
1'
society and free market economy."
Yet, no effort seems to have been made to secure host country
commitment to the goals of transparency and accountability before
investing over 13 million dollars into its multi-year Judicial Reform
Program. Moreover, USAID funded a multi-million dollar extension of

"[t]he SIU analyst focuses on statistics and workload indicators that are used to
determine bonuses rather than on analyzing data that could be used to identify
patterns of police, judicial and prosecutorial corruption." Id. Moreover, SU
work focuses almost exclusively on police misconduct, not corruption among
judges. Interview with Badamragchaa Purevdorj, Program Manager, Legal and
Human Rights Programs, Open Society Forum, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 18,
2008).
In contrast to this half-hearted approach, a comprehensive anti-corruption
program would have included measures to incentivize judicial integrity, shoreup judicial independence, create meaningful accountability, ensure actual
transparency and otherwise limit opportunities for judicial corruption. A list
concrete and specific measures that Mongolia could have taken, and might still
take given adequate political will, as part a comprehensive program to address
judicial corruption is included in Appendix A, infra.
111
Not only does judicial corruption benefit corrupt judges, but it also
facilitates grand corruption among other economic and political elites in
Mongolia. Absent pressure from donor agencies, there is simply no incentive
for these elites to promote anti-corruption reform in the judiciary, and plenty of
reason for them to actively obstruct it. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV.,
USAID ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY 11 (2005), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/
anticorruption strategy05.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) ("Sixty-nine percent
[of USAID missions] indicated that insufficient political commitment on the part
of national counterparts was a constraint [in combating corruption].").
112
REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 1.
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JRP, 113 despite indications of growing corruption within the judiciary
during the first six years of the Judicial Reform Program-indications
the JRP dismissed as "coincid[ing] with the public's overall
dissatisfaction with Mongolia's government." 114 As with the original
establishment of the JRP, the extension was funded without any
commitment from the judiciary to address the corruption issue. To the
contrary, the extension was granted in the face of demonstrated
stakeholder resistance to measures designed to improve accountability
within the courts-including changes to the judicial ethics code,
introduction of judicial performance evaluations, and reforms to ensure
115
the merit-based selection ofjudges.
Similarly, the World Bank funded the construction of the NLC116 and
recently invested an additional five million dollars, primarily to refurbish
the Supreme Court, 17 despite the widespread perception of undue
political influence and corruption with the judiciary. World Bank
funding was, on both occasions, not accompanied by a commitment from
the judiciary to address corruption issues. This lack of conditionality
seems incongruent with the Bank's view of corruption as "among the
greatest obstacles to economic and social development."'1 8 It is also
incongruent with the Bank's recognition that because "the legal system
will be the ultimate arbiter of any anticorruption program, a corrupt

113 REPORT

2006, supra note 5, at 3 ("JRP ... was granted a cost extension

in June [2006] to operate until June 30, 2008").
114 REPORT 2007, supra note 9, at 27.
115 See, e.g., REPORT 2007, supranote 9, at 8-10 (indicating, inter alia, that
JRP recommendations from 2006 to ensure merit-based selection of judges were
still on hold by the General Council of Courts at the end of 2007); REPORT 2006,
supra note 5, at 10-11 (discussing incomplete action from the General Council
of Courts on JRP recommendations to ensure merit based selection of judges
and on strengthening the judicial code of ethics); REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at
25 (noting that despite the JRP recommendations there was refusal to add
restrictions to the judicial code of ethics against ex partecommunications).
116 See The World Bank Group, supra note
52.
117 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 635.
118 The World Bank Group, Anticorruption:
Overview of Anticorruption
Continued, http://go.worldbank.org/K6AEEPROC0 (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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judiciary will fundamentally undermine anticorruption efforts
119
themselves."
Absent a high-level commitment to root out judicial corruption, "topdown" judicial reform programs are destined to neglect the core concerns
of judicial integrity, accountability, and transparency. Moreover, judicial
reform does not address these core issues, it is likely not only to fail but
also to perpetuate and reinforce perceptions of corruption within the
courts. 120

One lesson of Mongolia is thus one that has been learned

before: donors should not finance institutional reform ofjudiciaries "with
pervasive levels of corruption," 121 at least not until high-level political
leadership has demonstrated a commitment to combating judicial
corruption.
Another lesson is that donor-funded judicial reform projects risk
capture by target judiciaries-in much the same way that domestic
regulatory bodies risk capture by regulated industries. 122 The risk of
judicial capture arises as an initial matter because top-down approaches
to judicial reform typically depend on elites within target judicial
119

THE WORLD BANK, ANTICORRUPTION IN TRANSITION:

TO THE POLICY DEBATE 14 box 1.5 (2000).
120 Cf id. at 18. ("The costs of state capture

A

CONTRIBUTION

and administrative corruption

are mutually reinforcing ....).
121
U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., supranote 111, at 16-17 & box 1.
122See Jean-Philippe Platteau, Community-Based Development in the
Context of Within-Group Heterogeneity ("Project facilitators tend to easily fall
prey to local elites either because they are in a rush to show results and therefore
gloss over local power relations, or because they are too weak to resist their

pressure and the donor agency is not supporting them enough." (citation
omitted)),

in

ANNUAL

WORLD

BANK

CONFERENCE

ON

DEVELOPMENT

2004:
ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT, 241, 251 (Frangois
Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., 2004). See also THE WORLD BANK, supra
ECONOMICS

note 119, at 33-34 ("FDI firms headquartered in

...local

market[s] ...

are just

as likely [as domestic firms] to engage in state capture," and this is
"substantially more likely" when the firm is located in a country with existing
"high levels of administrative corruption and state capture.").
For a discussion of regulatory agency capture, see generally PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991) and Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and
Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration, "Agency Capture," and
Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 381 (2002).
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institutions for information as to the realities and needs on the
ground 123-particularly when donor project employees do not speak the
local language or have significant country expertise.124 This dependency
is compounded by the frequent physical location of donor projects within
target judicial institutions, which risks over-identification with
institutional interests at the cost of reform goals. 125 Similarly, close
working relationships, and friendships, that arise between project
employees and target institution employees can obscure objectivity and
lead to willful blindness to corruption within judicial institutions. 126 This
tendency for willful blindness can be exacerbated when, as is not
infrequently the case, high-ranking project employees themselves wish to
127
be identified with the political and social elites of the host country' _or
123See, e.g., Golub, supra note 9, at 17-19 (explaining that reformers

frequently operate without good information or knowledge of "the real intents of
the government officials who are their local partners").
124 Cf id. at 18 (noting that the knowledge of project facilitators often
"skate[s] along the surface of how a foreign society operates"); Platteau, supra
note 122, at 248 (stating that program "facilitators are too often young, poorly
paid, and inexperienced individuals"). See also Judicial Reform Program: Q4
Updates 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q4-05.html
(posting of Skip Waskin, Dec. 13, 2005, 20:13) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009)
(evidencing former JRP Chief of Party Ledbetter's lack of previous Mongolian
expertise or experience); Lawyer John A. Carver Appointed as the JRP Chief of
Party, http://www.ncsc.mn (follow link to document title) [hereinafter Carver
Appointed] (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (evidencing newly appointed JRP Chief's
lack of experience with or knowledge of Mongolia).
125See Platteau, supra note 122, at 244-45 (indicating that "social capital
may be harnessed against rather than in favor of vulnerable segments of the
population" as a result of close social and economic relationships with local
elites that act as a "barrier[] to entry" for the actual public interest).
126See id.at 242-43 (discussing the "praise culture" that arises among
actors in a top-down approach). One project manager in a donor-funded Judicial
Reform Program, for example, insisted that in "ten years" of working with the
Courts, he had never seen "any evidence" of judicial corruption or improper
influence. Interview with Javkhlan, GTZ Project Manager, Ulaanbaatar,
Mongolia (May 12, 2008).
127See ROSSABI, supra note 1, at 64-65 ("The lifestyles of the resident
representatives of the international donor agencies also raised some eyebrows.
A few, although certainly not all, lived in gated, guarded communities in
Ulaanbaatar, while a tiny group were in even more lavish surroundings, guarded
by the military, in an area where the president and the prime minister resided,
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are driven by career goals that "are not well aligned with the needs of
[the] projects. 128
A combination of these factors seems to have contributed to the
capture of USAID's Judicial Reform Program by elites within the
judiciary, who were then able to successfully direct the efforts of the
Judicial Reform Program toward their own priorities.1 29 These elites
understandably preferred to focus on activities such as courthouse
construction and repair, purchase of computers and equipment, judicial
training, and international jaunts rather than on accountability and
transparency.

130

Looking beyond Mongolia, the inherent risk of project capture in the
institution-building approach to judicial reform may help explain the
continued focus on resources and infrastructure in donor-funded judicial
reform projects, despite repeated criticism from both within and without
donor agencies that the approach yields dismal results.13 1 In other words,
judicial reform efforts may begin, as the USAID project in Mongolia
seems to have begun, with noble intentions of addressing "lack of
accountability and transparency,"132 but end up doing little to address
either as projects increasingly focus on the concerns and priorities of
which was closed to the public. Visitors had to have invitations; otherwise, the
military would not permit them to enter this compound. The spacious quarters,
well-appointed furnishings, and the latest appliances, contrasted sharply with the
lifestyles of all but the very highest officials with whom the foreign
representatives dealt.").
128 Platteau, supra note 122, at 248.
129 Cf REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 23 ("The Strategic Plan has a large
number of specific objectives and tasks. However, USAID, in consultation with
the Mongolian stakeholders, focused the JRP on a limited number of critical
areas which included: Court Administration and Case Management, Review of
Court and Justice Sector Agency Jurisdictions, Continuing Legal Education
(CLE), Lawyer Qualification, Public Education and improved Ethics.").
130See, e.g., Golub, supra note 9, at 8-9 (describing that the orthodox
institutional approach to judicial reform); Judicial Reform Program: Q4
Updates 2005, supra note 124 (posting of Skip Waskin, Nov. 9, 2005, 20:07)
(reporting study tour to Hawaii).
131See, e.g., id.
at 11-14 (documenting the "weak track record" of donor
efforts to promote rule of law through judicial reform and noting that "[e]xternal
reviews of ROL aid efforts have been highly critical").
132
REPORT 2002, supra note 6, at 1.
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In Mongolia, for example, this meant USAID's

Judicial Reform Program spent much of its final year focusing on
completing software upgrades that were considered the "highest
priorities" of "the Chief Justice and the Director of the General Council
of Courts" rather than addressing widespread perceptions of judicial
corruption. 133 Indeed, USAID's view that its Judicial Reform Program
was a great success seems closely tied to "complet[ing] the development
and testing of the new Judge2008 automated case tracking and caseflow
management software" and "hand[ing] over" the software prior to the
project's termination in March 2009.134 While this software upgrade
may in fact have been a significant accomplishment, such technical
progress is overshadowed by growing corruption, bias, and other forms
135
of undue influence within the Mongolian judiciary.
USAID's rosy picture of the success of judicial reform in Mongolia
simply cannot be squared with the continuing presence of rampant
corruption within the judiciary and the crisis of public legitimacy that the
courts face as a result. The divergence between USAID's assessment of
its Judicial Reform Program's impact and the shared negative assessment
of the courts among local experts highlights, at a minimum, the need for
independent, outside review of the progress and success of donor-funded
reform projects. 136 This need arises from the intrinsic incentives for
donor agencies, their implementing partners, and their employees to
oversell the success of reform projects. First, donor agencies must
133

USAID/Mongolia Programs August 2008, http://www.usaid.gov/mn!

programs/jrp/jrp-update-367.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
134 USAID/Mongolia Programs February 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/
programs/jrp/jrp-update-566.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
135 See, e.g., Golub, supra note 9, at 18 ("Although technical progress can
take place even in the face of undue influences, where such influences are
widespread they tend to trump the value of the technical change.").
136 Cf REPORT 2006, supra note 5, at 4 (revealing a lack of independent
monitoring of the JRP in that the review was conducted by of key stakeholders,
namely "a group of representatives from the judiciary, prosecution, advocacy
and MoJHA led by the JRP's consultant"). See generally LIVINGSTON
ARMYTAGE, CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MONITORING PERFORMANCE OF
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:
EARLY LESSONS FROM PORT MORESBY & PHNOM PENH 3 (2006), available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Monitoring
Impact.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (arguing for increased "monitoring and
evaluation of legal and judicial reform efforts around the world").
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justify judicial reform programs in countries where candid assessment of
the progress ofjudicial reform might raise questions about the proper use
of taxpayer funds. Second, implementing partners, such as the National
Center for State Courts which oversaw the Judicial Reform Program in
Mongolia and the ABA Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative,
which oversees USAID judicial reform programs in much of Central
Asia and Eastern Europe, compete for USAID funds and must tout the
success of their projects both to secure extensions of existing projects
and to win future projects and grants. Third, high-ranking employees of
these organizations often go from country-to-country as "judicial reform
experts," leveraging
"successful" reform efforts for other high-level
7
positions.

13

Even independent assessments of donor funded projects, however,
cannot address the fundamental problem with the top-down, institutionoriented approach to judicial reform: It just doesn't work, particularly in
countries characterized by systemic corruption. 138 Despite USAID's
137

See, e.g., ABA Rule of Law Initiative Europe and Eurasia Divsision

Staff, http://www.abanet.org/rol/staff-ceeli.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2009)
(stating that former JRP Chief of Party Gary Ledbetter left Mongolia to work for
the ABA as a Country Director for its judicial reform program in Georgia); JRP
Chief of Party, Robert La Mont, To Leave Mongolia, MONG. JUD. REFORM
PROGRAM MONTHLY NEWSL., Sept 15-Oct 15, 2006, at 1, 1-2, available at
http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Newsletter/EN/Newsletter62English.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2009) (reporting that former JRP Chief of Party to begin a USAID
judicial reform project in Indonesia); JRP Project Director, Dr. Heike

Gramckow, To Leave the NationalCenterfor State Courts,MONG. JUD. REFORM
PROGRAM MONTHLY NEWSL., March 2008, at 1, 1-2, available at
http://www.ncsc.mn/MJRP/Newsletter/EN/Newsletter76English.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2009) (reporting that former JRP Director to take a position as the
Senior Legal Counsel to the World Bank's Legal and Judicial Reform Group);
and Carver Appointed, supra note 124 (reporting that current Chief of Party,
John Carver previously worked for USAID in both Haiti and Mexico).
118 Golub, supra note 9, at 11-14 (documenting the "weak track record" of
donor efforts to promote rule of law and arguing the folly of such efforts). See
generally HARRY
JUSTICE:

BLAIR

&

GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE SCALES OF

STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW

§ 3 (1994), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our work/democracy
and governance/publications/pdfs/pnaax280.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009)
(noting the folly of the institution-oriented strategy to judicial reform where
PROGRAMS
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claims to the contrary, Mongolia is no exception. Rather, the record of
judicial reform in Mongolia should add to calls for a shift from
institution-building, top-down models of judicial reform to bottom-up,
community-based models designed to empower local communities to
fight on their own against corruption, bias, and unequal access to
justice.!

corruption is rampant); THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD:
THE LEARNING CURVE 170-76 (1999) (reporting the "disappointing" record of
USAID work with judiciaries across the world); WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE
JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC

DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA:

DECLINING

CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW 1-9 (2000) (offering bleak assessment of
donor funded judicial reform in Latin America); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/NSAID-93-149, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: PROMOTING JUDICIAL
REFORM To STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACIES (1993) (finding serious flaws in the

institutional approach to judicial reform in Latin America); Klaus Decker et al.,
Law or Justice: Building EquitableLegal Institutions 18 (World Bank, Working

Paper No. 33653, 2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/2YW13HB0O
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
139 See generally DANIEL MANNING, THE ROLE OF LEGAL SERVICES
ORGANIZATIONS IN ATTACKING POVERTY 5-6 (1999), available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPGENDER/Resources/Role
Legal en.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAWRELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD (Mary
McClymont
&
Stephen
Golub
eds.,
2000),
available
at
http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/many roads.pdf (last visited Oct. 28,
2009); Golub, supranote 9, at 25-41 (calling for "legal empowerment" approach
to reform); Monica Das Gupta et al., Fostering Community-Driven
Development: What Role for the State? 1-3 (World Bank, Policy Research

Working Paper No. 2969, 2003).

2009]

JUDICIAL REFORMINMONGOLIA

APPENDIX A: COMPREHENSIVE REFORM MEASURES TO ADDRESS
JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
"[T]he [Multilateral Development] Banks and other international
agencies" have failed to develop an "effective[] judicial anti-corruption
strategy" in spite of continuing involvement in combating judicial
corruption. 140 Meanwhile, judicial reform experts have in fact identified
a number of specific, targeted measures that can be effective in reducing
corruption, especially when combined in a comprehensive anticorruption program. Given the apparent lack of political will within the
Mongolian judiciary to address corruption, however, the list below is
meant primarily to identify measures-both tested and new-that civil
society organizations, NGOs, and private industry could push for in
Mongolia to combat judicial corruption.
Moreover, some of the
measures could be undertaken with or without the cooperation of the
courts and might thus be appropriate avenues for donor funding.
Measures To Incentivize JudicialIntegrity
1. Judges should be subjected to periodic judicial performance
evaluations designed to, at a minimum, evaluate each judge's integrity,
fairness, temperament, legal knowledge, legal reasoning, diligence and
professionalism. 141 These evaluations should be based upon confidential
surveys completed by members of the bar and members of the general
public who have appeared before the judge. Judges' overall scores on
these periodic surveys should be made publicly available. Ideally, such
evaluations should be administered by an independent commissionwith the backing of the General Council of Courts, the Ministry of
Justice and Home Affairs, and the Mongolian Bar Association.
However, it would also be possible for civil society organizations to
conduct the performance evaluations independently and publicize the
results. Such evaluations might serve as further evidence of the need for
the types of reforms proposed below.

140 Hammergren, supranote 7, at 73.
141 See generally INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM, TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSETM: A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (2006), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/

TransparentCourthouse.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (outlining a judicial
performance evaluation program).
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2. Minimum qualification requirements should be established for
newly appointed judges. Judges should be required to have graduated
from a law school, 142 passed the bar exam,
and have at least three years
143
prosecutor.
or
attorney
an
experience as
3. Selection of judges should be based on objective criteria, such as
scores on a civil service exam with only the highest scorers eligible for
appointment, in order of their scores. 144 Such a system would not only
ensure that the most qualified individuals were appointed to the bench,
but also mitigate social exchange corruption pressures inherent in the
145
current appointment system.
4. In order to incentivize good judging, promotions within the court
system (for example, from district court judge to appellate court judge),
and the level of a judge's pay, should be merit-based-at least in some
significant way. 146

142

Ideally judges should be required to have graduated from an accredited

law school. Likewise, Mongolia should also implement accreditation standards
for law schools. Because Mongolia currently does not have an accreditation
process for law schools, there has been a proliferation of law schools of
questionable quality.
143 See, e.g., Carlo Guarnieri, ProfessionalQualificationsof the Judiciary
in

Italy, France,and Germany (citing the German practice of requiring high marks
on state exam and six years of training before full judicial appointment), in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 56, 59; Keith Henderson,
The Rule of Law and Judicial Corruptionin China: Half-way Over the Great

Wall (noting that China now requires all judges to have a college degree and to
pass a national examination, both significant steps in the arena of Chinese

judicial reform), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 151,
157.

144 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5,

at 19-20 (discussing the civil law

model, which creates a more apolitical judiciary through emphasis on lifetime

civil service that begins with a competitive exam and promotion through the
judicial hierarchy pursuant to evaluation by superiors and special councils).
145 See Transparency International, Executive Summary:

Key Judicial

Corruption Problems ("Failure to appoint judges on merit can lead to the
selection of pliant, corruptible judges."), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007,
supra note 5, at xxi, xxiv.
146 See Yang & Erichs, supranote 18, at 51-52 (supporting the promotion
of
judges through transparent, merit-based criteria in order to prevent promotions
due to political affiliation and/or improper means).
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5. Judges' salaries should be sufficiently high to attract the best legal
minds and also high enough that judges will be reluctant to engage in
corrupt activities that risk their jobs. This would require salaries in the
USD$1,000 to $3,000 range-with a judge's actual pay within that range
determined by merit. Additionally, judges' salaries should, by law, never
decrease-except for demotions with the defined pay range for judicial
misconduct. However, the proposed salary increases should not take
place until the judiciary adopts a no tolerance policy toward corruption
and puts in place specific mechanisms
designed ensure judicial
147
accountability.
and
transparency
Reforms Targeted at Transparency

1. A transparent system for the assignment of cases, such as a
lottery, should be developed. Once assigned to a case, the rules should
provide that a judge may be removed only for good cause, such as a
conflict of interest.

148

2. Notices should be posted on every courtroom that all proceedings
are open to the public, regardless of whether the member of the public
has any connection to the case being heard. Judges and clerks should be
149
censured for failing to allow open access.

147 See Tom Blass, Combating Corruption and Political Influence in

Russia's Court System (favoring judicial salaries which achieve parity to
comparable private sector industry salaries so as to reduce incidences of bribery
and to retain a qualified judiciary), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007,
supra note 5, at 31, 34. See also Yang & Erichs, supranote 18, at 49 (defining
"adequate" salaries for the judiciary as salaries which allow legal professionals
to "support their families, remain loyal to their profession and, at least, have no
economic 'need' for resorting to corruption").
148 See Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption Within the Judiciary:
Causes and
Remedies (preferring random case assignment so as to avoid the intentional
assignment of particular cases to corrupt judges), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION
REPORT

2007 supra note 5, at 3, 8.

149 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 21 (mentioning the role of open

public access to trials and court proceedings as a check on judicial power). See
also Edward Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption and the Broader Justice System
(arguing that public court proceedings are correlated with lower incidences of
corruption), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 67, 72.
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3. District courts should be required by law produce written
decisions that discuss the relevant facts and law and explain the
reasoning behind their decisions.15 °
4. All court decisions and court filings should be made available on
a daily basis in a public access or media tray at each courthouse, so that
the media or other members of the public can review the filings and
decisions and thereby monitor the daily activities of the court.151
5. Verbatim transcripts should be produced of all court proceedings.
These transcripts should be available to both litigants and any member of
the public for a reasonable fee-and should 152
be provided free to indigent
litigants who need the transcripts for appeal.
6. An official reporter system should be established to collect and
publish all district court, appellate court, and Supreme Court decisions.
Preferably, the reporter system should be electronic and online to ensure
broad access, reduce costs, and enable timely publication. There should
also be free computer access terminals to the reporter system at the
National Legal Center in Ulaanbaatar and other convenient locations in

150

See Rena Safarelieva, Azerbaijan's Yawning Gap Between Reforms on

Paper and in Practice (recommending the online publication of all Azerbaijan's
Supreme Court, economic court and constitutional court decisions and requiring
that these decisions provide written reasoning explaining the verdict of each
case), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supranote 5, at 175, 178.
151 Copy machines should be available so that media organizations, civil
society organizations, and other members of the public can, for a reasonable fee,
make copies of court filings and decisions. Media organizations, and possibly
civil society organizations, should assign "court reporters" the responsibility of
checking the public access or media tray on a daily basis. See, e.g., Buscaglia,
supra note 149, at 74 (finding that effective monitoring of the court occurs
through public access to judicial procedures as well as social pressure created by
media assessment and critique).
152 Cf Press Release, New Jersey Judiciary, New Appellate Pilot Program
Helps Indigent Litigant Obtain Free Legal Representation (September 13, 2007)
(discussing New Jersey pilot program established to provide for representation
for indigent litigants involved in the appellate process, where volunteer
attorneys purchase trial record for indigent clients), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/pr070913a.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2009).
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each Aimag or Soum for use by attorneys and other members of the
public.153
7. The public should be provided meaningful access to information
about the status of cases before the courts. Such information should be
provided in the form of a "docket sheet," which should, for example, list
the title and date of all court filings, list all actions taken by the court
such as hearings and rulings on motions, and the date of any future
hearings or court deadlines. These docket sheets should be available not
only via public access terminals in the court houses, but also online.
8. A court observer program should be instituted to monitor whether
judges exclude the public from hearings and follow proper procedures.
Observers should also evaluate judges on their fairness, temperament,
and professionalism. A previous court observer program conducted by
law students at Otgontenger University could be revamped and revived
for this purpose.

154

9. De novo appeals should be eliminated.
10. Uniform rules of evidence should be adopted and published.
These rules of evidence should be trans-substantive and applied in all
court proceedings.
11. A uniform code of civil procedure should be adopted and
published. The code of civil procedure should be trans-substantive and
applied in all civil proceedings.
12. Upon termination of trial court proceedings, all court users
should be given an easy-to-understand pamphlet explaining their right to
appeal and describing clearly the necessary steps and deadlines to file
such an appeal. The pamphlet should also inform individuals of the right
to receive a copy of the trial court's written decision and, if they are
unable to pay for it, a free copy of the record of trial court proceedings.
Reforms Targeted at Accountability

1. A separate body should be established to investigate judicial
misconduct-or the current Judicial Disciplinary Committee should be
reconstituted. No judges should be on the Committee, nor should it be
headed, as it is currently, by the Chief Justice. Members of the
Committee should not be politically appointed, but rather selected by a
153

See Pepys, supra note 148, at 9 (finding that publishing judicial

decisions reduces judicial corruption).
114 See Court Observer Program, supra note 96.
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civil service exam or some other objective measure. The Committee
should have investigative and subpoena powers and the
resources to
1 55
conduct investigations, including undercover operations.
2. A clear set of rules for removal of judges from office should be
developed to ensure that judges may be removed from office or
otherwise punished only for specified official misconduct
through a
156
transparent process, governed by objective criteria.
3. Independent audits of the Judicial Disciplinary Committee should
be conducted to ensure the proper and consistent investigation of
complaints of judicial misconduct. The results of these audits should be
made public.

157

4. The procedures and rules for investigating and disciplining judges
should be revamped in according to best international practices so that:
(a) the disciplinary process is more transparent and fair, with strict and
exacting standards; (b) the standard of proof is not so high as to
effectively shield judges from a finding of misconduct; (c) judges who
are eventually found to have engaged in misconduct are publicly
identified; and, (d) if there is a finding of corruption, the judge is
prosecuted as matter of policy and practice.
155

See Oluyemi Osinbajo, Sub-NationalReform Efforts: The Lagos State

Experience (citing the implementation of an independent investigation panel to
examine claims of judicial corruption), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007,
supra note 5, at 146, 149. See also, Transparency International, Country
Reports on JudicialCorruption: Introduction (recommending the creation of an
independent disciplinary committee with the authority to investigate complaints

of judicial wrongdoing in countries where there is strong political influence on
the judiciary and arbitrary discipline of independent judges), in GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 167, 169.

156 See Transparency International, Executive Summary: Key Judicial

Corruption Problems (stressing the importance of standardized discipline and

removal procedures to minimize the removal of independent judges because of
political differences), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at
xxi, xxvi. See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that U.S. federal
judges are removed only for egregious behavior).
157 See Roxana Salazar & Josd Pablo Ramos, IncreasedTransparencyHelps
Curb Corruptionin Costa Rica (discussing Costa Rican reforms, which created
a supreme judicial council with administrative and disciplinary duties as well as
a separate tribunal of judicial inspection which handles complaints against the
judiciary), in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at, 190, 191.
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5. The Judicial Code of Ethics should be revised in keeping with
international best practices. At a minimum, the Code should be amended
to:
* Prohibit ex parte communications with parties or their
lawyers. 158
* Prohibit high court or senior judges from discussing pending or
prospective cases with junior or lower court judges.
" Prohibit judges from hearing any case where a relative was
involved in any part of the case, including as a lower court judge
hearing the case, a prosecutor trying the case, or an attorney or
159
party on either side of the litigation.
"
Prohibit judges from engaging in any employment other than as
a judge, or from owning, in whole or in part, any business
6
enterprise.

*

0

Clearly define what constitutes a conflict of interest and prohibit
judges from hearing161any case in which there is a real or apparent
conflict of interest.

*

Prohibit judges from discussing pending or prospective litigation
with any individual outside the court, whether a private
individual or government official.
6. Rigorous asset and income disclosures should be required, and the
burden should be placed on judges to document lawful sources for all
income and assets.162

See Hammergren, supra note 7, at 77 (intimating that ex parte
communications, though not always "readily perceived as corruption by the lay
person," are nevertheless a damaging form ofjudicial corruption).
158

159

See Greg Mayne, JudicialIntegrity: The Accountability Gap and the

BangalorePrinciples(supporting judicial restrictions to prohibit members of the
judiciary from hearing cases involving family members, as well as prohibiting
family members from appearing before judges in any capacity), in GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 5, at 40, 42.
160 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that the United States
has strict laws restricting business activities of judges).

See Transparency International, supra note 155, at 170 (advocating the
need for a clear description of "conflict of interest" and a requirement that
judges report such conflicts of interest and recuse themselves from cases in
which conflicts exist).
161
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7. Judges should be required to disclose the identities of all relatives
(including their degree of relation) who are, or were, previously judges,
prosecutors, or attorneys.
8. A judicial "family tree" should be constructed and publicized to
highlight family connections with the judiciary and to help monitor
conflicts of interests.
Special Anti-CorruptionMeasures

1. A jury system should be considered-at least in criminal cases
which defendants face jail time and in civil matters where the amount in
163
dispute is over Tug 10 million.
2.
Individuals who report judicial corruption should receive
whistleblower protection. Such protection must include immunity from
prosecution and immunity from civil or criminal liability for defamation
should the corruption not ultimately be substantiated (at least in absence
evidence of malice or actual knowledge by the individual that the
allegation was false at the time it was made). 164
3. Judges should be rotated to different courts, including courts in
different Aimags and Soums in order to mitigate the corrupting effect of
social exchange relationships. Such rotations should ideally require

162 See

Pepys, supra note 148, at 9 (advocating for thorough verification and

monitoring system of judges' assets). See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 5, at

21 (highlighting the United States' practice of strict asset disclosure
requirements for judges).

See Brent T. White, Putting Aside the Rule of Law Myth: Corruption
and the Case for Juries in Emerging Democracies, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1359338 (last visited
163

Oct. 28, 2009) (manuscript at 3) (arguing that juries can serve as an effective
means of combating judicial corruption and of increasing public trust in the
fairness of the judicial process).
164 See Paul Latimer & A.J. Brown, Whistleblower Laws: International

Best Practice 18-22, (Monash U. Dep't of Bus. L. & Taxation Research Paper
No. 1326766, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1326766 (last visited
Oct. 28, 2009) (finding that best practices of whistleblower protection laws
include support of disclosure of wrongdoing as well as trust in the system
stemming from protection from civil or criminal liability, discrimination and
retaliation).
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judges to move to a different court every few years. 165 A less disruptive
alternative, however, might be to require judges to rotate during parts of
the year (such as during the summer months) to courts in different
Aimags or Soums.

161

See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China's Civil Procedure:

Judging the Courts, 45 AM. J. COMP. L., 793, 803 (1997) (proposing that the
Chinese judiciary system follow example of the Chinese imperial system which
required magistrates to move every three years to decrease the development of
collusive relationships).
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY OF THE STATUS OF COURT REFORM IN
MONGOLIA
This survey seeks your input on the status of court reform in Mongolia.
Your responses will remain anonymous. If you do not have sufficient
knowledge to respond to any particular item, please leave it blank.
Years in Legal Profession:
Current Position (optional):
Years in Current Position (optional):
Please state your agreement or disagreement with the statements below
according to following scale:
Strongly disagree
1
Disagree
2
Neutral
3
Agree
4
Strongly Agree
5

1. Judges are well-qualified. (Judges have formal
university-level legal training and have practiced
before tribunals before taking the bench.)

1 2

3

4

5

2. Judges are well-trained. (Before taking the
bench judges are required to take relevant courses
concerning basic substantive and procedural areas
of the law and the role of the judge in society.)

1

2

3

4

5

3. Judges receive adequate continuing legal
education. (Judges must undergo, on a regular
basis professionally prepared legal education
courses, which adequately inform them of changes
and developments in the law.)

1

2

3

4

5

4. The number ofjudges who are members of
ethic and religious minorities adequately reflects
the percentage of ethic and religious minorities in
the overall population.

1

2

3

4

5
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5. The number of male and female judges is
roughly equal at all levels of the court system.

1 2

3

4

5

6. Court decisions are respected and enforced by
other branches of government

1

2

3

4

5

7. The courts provide adequate oversight over the
administrative practices of the executive branch.
(In other words, the court has the power to review
administrative acts and to compel the government
to act where a legal duty to act exists-and it
exercises this power when appropriate.)

1

2

3

4

5

8. Court decisions may be reversed only through
the appellate process.

1

2

3

4

5

9. Courts have adequate subpoena, contempt, and
enforcement powers.

1

2

3

4

5

10. The courts' subpoena, contempt, and
enforcement powers are utilized and supported by
other branches of government.

1

2

3

4

5

11. Other branches of government do not override
or ignore court decisions, or if they do, they are
subject to legal action.

1

2

3

4

5

12. The overall budget of the courts is adequate to
satisfy the demand for court services.

1

2

3

4

5

13. The overall budget of the courts has increased
proportionately with the growth of the national
budget.

1

2

3

4

5

14. The judiciary receives a share of the national
budget reflective of its position as co-equal branch
of government

1

2

3

4

5

15. Offices provided to judges and court
administrators are adequate to allow performance
of their duties

1

2

3

4

5

12

3

4

5

16. The court system operates with a sufficient
number of computers and other equipment to
enable it to handle its caseload in a reasonably
efficient manner.
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17. Each judge has the staff support necessary to
do his or her job, e.g., adequate support staff to
handle documentation and legal research.

1 2

3

4

5

18. A system exists so that new court positions are
created as needed

1

2

3

4

5

19. Judges' salaries are adequate. (Judges'
salaries meet some reasonable proportion of good
wage in private sector, are generally sufficient to
attract and retain qualified judges, enabling them to
support their families and live in a reasonably
secure environment, without having to have
recourse to other sources of income).

1

2

3

4

5

20. Court buildings provide a respectable
environment for the dispensation of justice with
adequate infrastructure.

1

2

3

4

5

21. The court system has sufficient input and
control over its own budget. (The courts have a
meaningful opportunity to influence the amount of
money allocated to the courts by the legislative
and/or executive branches, and, once funds are
allocated to the courts, the courts have control over
their own budget and how such funds are
expended).

1

2

3

4

5

22. The selection and appointment process fosters
the selection of independent, impartial judges.
(Judges are appointed based on objective criteria,
such as passage of an exam, performance in law
school, other training, experience, professionalism,
and reputation in the legal community. While
political elements may be involved, the overall
system fosters the selection of independent,
impartial judges).

1 2

3

4

5

1 2

3

4

5

23. There is adequate security for judges.
(Sufficient resources are allocated to protect judges
from threats such as harassment, assault, and
assassination).
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24. Judges have guaranteed tenure. Judges are
appointed for fixed terms that provide a guaranteed
tenure, which is protected until retirement age or
the expiration of a defined term of substantial
duration.

1 2

3

4

5

25. Judges are promoted through the court system
on the basis of objective criteria such as ability,
integrity, and experience.

1

2

3

4

5

26. Judges may be removed from office or
otherwise punished only for specified official
misconduct and through a transparent process,
governed by objective criteria.

1

2

3

4

5

27. Once assigned to a case, a judge may be
removed only for good cause, such as a conflict of
interest or an unduly heavy workload.

1

2

3

4

5

28. A judges' association exists, the sole aim of
which is to protect and promote the interests of the
courts, and this organization is active.

1

2

3

4

5

29. Court decisions are free from political
influence from other branches of government or
other public officials.

1

2

3

4

5

30. Court decisions are not influenced by
payments, gifts, or favors from litigants or other
interested parties.

1

2

3

4

5

31. Court decisions are free from impropriety.
Family, social, business, or other relationships do
not influence judges' court conduct or judgment.

1

2

3

4

5

32. Court decisions are free from the appearance
of impropriety. Judges refrain from hearing cases
in which the judge's family, social, business, or
other relationships may create the appearance of a
conflict of interest, whether or not such a conflict
actually exist.

1

2

3

4

5
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33. Judges refrain from ex parte communications.
(Judges refrain from substantive communication
with parties and their attorneys regarding matters
before the court outside the presence of the other
parties or their attorneys).

1 2

3

4

5

34. Trial court decisions are reached without any
undue influence from senior judges within the
courts (e.g., chief judges, Supreme Court judges,
etc...).

1

2

3

4

5

35. The code of ethics for judges adequately
defines and prohibits judges from hearing cases in
which they have a conflict of interest.

1

2

3

4

5

36. The code of ethics for judges prohibits ex parte
communications.

1

2

3

4

5

37. The code of ethics for judges prohibits judges
from engaging in political activity.

1

2

3

4

5

38. A meaningful process exists under which other
judges, lawyers, and the public may register
complaints concerning misconduct by individual
judges.

1

2

3

4

5

39. Complaints of misconduct by judges are
adequately investigated.

1

2

3

4

5

40. Complaints of misconduct by judges are
investigated without political interference from
other branches of government.

1

2

3

4

5

41. Investigations of misconduct by judges are not
influenced by unofficial payments, gifts, or favors
from judges or other interested parties.

1

2

3

4

5

42. Supreme Court and significant appellate
opinions are subjected to academic scrutiny.

1

2

3

4

5

43. Supreme Court and significant appellate
opinions are subjected to scrutiny by the media and
the general public.

1

2

3

4

5
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44. Judges are assigned to cases by an objective
method, such as by lottery, or according to their
specific areas of expertise.

1 2

3

4

5

45. Courtroom proceedings are open to the public
and the media.

1

2

3

4

5

46. Courtrooms have adequate space to
accommodate the public and the media.

1

2

3

4

5

47. Court decisions are generally a matter of
accessible public record.

1

2

3

4

5

48. Supreme Court and significant appellate
opinions are published.

1

2

3

4

5

49. Transcripts or some other reliable record of
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are
available to litigants and their attorneys.

1

2

3

4

5

50. Transcripts or some other reliable record of
courtroom proceedings are maintained and are
available to the media and general public.

1

2

3

4

5

51. The court system maintains an effective and
accessible case filing and tracking system that
ensures cases are heard in a reasonably efficient
manner.

1

2

3

4

5

12

3

4

5

52. Court users have easy access to information on
the status of their case.
53. Current law is distributed and indexed. (There
is a nationally recognized system for indexing
current domestic laws and jurisprudence and
identifying and organizing changes in the law).

1

2

3

4

5

54. Procedural rules for handling cases are
standardized and time limits are set for the
completion of various stages of litigation.

1

2

3

4

5

55. Judges follow and enforce procedural rules.

1

2

3

4

5

56. Rules of evidence exist as to what evidence
judges may or may not consider.

1

2

3

4

5
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57. Judges follow any existing rules of evidence
(Judges do not consider improper evidence nor
exclude proper evidence).

1

2

3

4

5

58. Court standards for evaluating legal arguments
exist and are applied in a predictable fashion.

1

2

3

4

5

59. The pre-trial settlement of disputes is
encouraged but not forced.

1

2

3

4

5

60. Established alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration
provide a viable alternative to court processes.

1

2

3

4

5

Please add any comments relating to any of your responses above. In
particular, we would be very interested in your thoughts as to the most
pressing issues, if any, that need to be addressed in reforming the
Mongolian Courts. Please use additional pages as necessary.
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